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1. Introduction 
In industrialized countries, intellectual property rights (IPR) are part of the infrastructure supporting 
investments in Research and Development (R&D) leading to innovation. By granting temporary 
exclusive rights on inventions, IPR allow the right-holders to price their products above marginal 
cost, and hence recoup their initial research investment. Such exclusive right creates incentives for 
the conduct of R&D.  
On the other hand, by granting monopoly rights on an invention, IPR impede its dissemination. The 
resulting underprovision of protected goods and monopoly distortions are usually considered ac-
ceptable costs for the creation of new knowledge and the increase in social welfare that it entails 
(Gaisford et al, 2001). Overall, IPR are perceived as contributing to the promotion of technological 
innovation and to the transfer and dissemination of technology, in a manner conducive to social and 
economic welfare (WTO-TRIPs Agreement, Art. 7). Still, growing numbers of experts question 
these affirmations for developing countries (LDCs) and argue that IPR “do little to stimulate inno-
vation in developing countries” (CIPR, 2002: 1). 
Given their lower innovative capabilities, IPR might not support local innovation in LDCs. Hence 
strong IP protection would not lead to higher domestic innovation levels, as exemplified by a case 
study of the maize breeding industry in Mexico (Léger, 2005). However, strong IPR would still 
impose the costs related to monopoly distortions on foreign inventions, leading to a net welfare loss. 
Still, IPR is an important issue in bilateral, regional and multilateral trade negotiations. Pressure is 
put on LDCs to sign up for stronger standards of IP protection (Fink and Maskus, 2005), without 
having a clear picture of the impacts IPR have in these economies. 
More generally, the determinants of innovation in LDCs are still a relatively understudied research 
area, both theoretically and empirically. LDCs differ from industrialized countries in several re-
spects - institutional, cultural and economic -  which can affect innovation. Therefore their case 
  1deserves particular attention, especially given the importance innovation could have in supporting 
their process of economic development.  
Given the little guidance offered by the theoretical literature and the scarcity of empirical evidence 
for LDCs, the study intends to identify the determinants of innovation, using a novel dataset of 
LDCs and industrialized countries.  
The following section presents background information related to innovation, its determinants and 
IPR to define the theoretical concept. Section 3 presents the methodology and the data used, and 
section 4 presents the results of the estimations. Section 5 discusses the results obtained and section 
6 concludes.  
 
2. Theory 
2.1. Innovation: Nature and determinants 
Through the innovation process, a new product (or process) is created, as well as new information, 
which has public good characteristics, i.e. non-rivalry and non-excludability. These two properties 
of information make the gains from innovation uncertain and difficult to appropriate, which implies 
that R&D opportunities that would be socially profitable are not exploited because they are pri-
vately unprofitable. In order for innovation to be undertaken, incentives need to be given. IPR is 
suggested as one possible government intervention to correct for this market failure
i. 
Three main reasons exist for innovation. First, the possibility of increased profits and market share, 
secured by IPR or other mechanisms (e.g. first-mover advantage, secrecy) motivates investments in 
innovative activity. Second, innovation would react to “demand-pull” factors (Schmookler, 1966), 
i.e., the perceived demand for new products and processes. Conversely, “technology-push” factors, 
that are related to advancements in technology and science, would also play an important role 
(Cohen and Klepper, 1996).   
The environment in which the firm operates also affects its innovative performance. At the macro-
economic level, economic and political stability (Lall, 1992) provides an environment supportive of 
innovation. Market structure also affects incentives to innovate – either positively or negatively, 
  2depending on the situation – hence competition must also be taken into account (Grossman and 
Helpman, 1991). R&D being an expensive and risky endeavor, access to capital and diversification 
possibilities are essential for most firms. Finally, innovation cannot take place without qualified 
scientists and workers, hence the level of human capital in the country is another important factor 
(Crespo et al, 2004). 
Even though innovation could play a crucial role for LDCs, most of the literature so far has focused 
on industrialized countries. However, LDC characteristics could differ enough from the usual mod-
els and call for another treatment. Demand-pull factors have a limited impact in LDCs, given the 
generally small purchasing power of their inhabitants. Markets are often incomplete, weak or non-
existent (Lall, 1992), which, for certain areas such as risk, capital (financial and human) and infor-
mation, has important implications for the conduct of innovative activities. The institutional envi-
ronment is characterized by the presence of high transaction costs, which often include corruption 
(Collier, 1998), and by weak institutions. These could affect the functioning of the market and the 
transmission of signals – e.g. demand for certain goods – to the innovators. Furthermore, the per-
formance of IPR, a market-based tool, in malfunctioning markets, still has to be investigated. 
 
2.2. IPR in a North-South setting 
A few papers have been written about innovation and IPR in an international context. In a North-
South setting, where only the North can innovate and the South has lower labor costs, Deardorff 
(1992) finds that strengthening IPR hurts the South and benefits the North. Another study (Chin and 
Grossman, 1990) reaches similar conclusions, except for the case of highly productive R&D, for 
which international IP protection increases global welfare. There is however always a conflict of 
interest between the North and the South. Zigic (1998) extends this model to allow for different 
levels of IP protection and finds that this conflict holds when R&D efficiency is low, but that the 
interests could be in congruence for higher R&D efficiency levels. Similarly, in a model assuming 
different preferences in the North and the South, strong IP protection in the South provides incen-
tives for Northern innovation addressing Southern needs, hence benefiting both regions (Diwan and 
  3Rodrik, 1991). Using an endogenous growth model, including imitation and technology transfer, 
Helpman (1993) finds that strengthening of IPR spurs innovation in the North in the short-run but 
slows it in the long run. The South also loses from stronger IPR, through a deterioration of its terms 
of trade, a slowdown of innovation and the reallocation of production from the South (low-cost) to 
the North.  
A few studies examined the link between IP protection and innovation for panels of countries 
(Alfranca and Huffman, 2003; Kanwar and Evenson, 2003; Lederman and Maloney, 2003). The 
former study uses a panel of EU countries to provide evidence quantifying the effects of economic 
incentives and institutions on private innovation in agriculture, while the other two papers use pan-
els of industrialized and developing countries. They find the level of IP protection, institutional 
quality, economic openness, demand pull factors and availability of credit to be positive and signifi-
cant factors explaining innovation. Conversely, risk and interest rate have negative impacts. These 
results are consistent with the literature, but LDCs are either not or underrepresented in these stud-
ies, and there is no explicit control for the level of development of the countries.   
From this short overview of the literature, it is clear that the environment in which innovation takes 
place in LDCs supports investigating its determinants specifically for these countries. Furthermore, 
special attention is given to the role of IPR. It is disputed in the theoretical literature and more em-
pirical evidence could guide the theory in the appropriate direction.  
 
3. Methodology 
3.1. Data  
Based on the review of the literature presented in the preceding section, the factors most likely to 
influence innovation are presented in table 1, along with the expected signs of the parameters, the 
variables used in the estimation and their sources. Estimations are performed on two datasets: a 
sample of industrialized countries and a sample of developing countries
ii. African countries are un-
derrepresented in this dataset, which can bias the results in favor of more advanced LDCs, however 
data are simply not available for these countries. Table 2 presents the summary statistics. 
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Innovation  
 
  Total R&D expenditures as a proportion of 








Demand-pull factors  +  Gross domestic product (GDP) per capita 
(constant 2000 US$) (GDPPC) 
Population (latest year)  (POP) 
World Development 
Indicators (WDI) 
(World Bank, 2005) 
Technology-push 
factors 






+   GDP growth rate (GDPG)   WDI 2005 
Political instability  -   State failure events dummy (POL)   Constructed from 
State failure task force 
Access to capital  +   Saving as a proportion of GDP (SAV)   WDI (2005) 
Cost of capital  -   Deposit interest rate (INTRATE)   WDI (2005)  





Index of IP protection  (IP) 
 
Park and Ginarte, 
(1997) 
Human capital  +   Years of schooling, above 15 (EDU) 
  
 Barro-Lee data set 
(2000) 
 
Innovation, the dependent variable, can be proxied using outputs, for example the number of pat-
ented inventions per year, or inputs, e.g. investments in innovation. Given the relatively recent in-
troduction of IPR systems in LDCs, and the fact that not all innovations are patentable nor patented, 
the input-proxy is preferred.  
 
Table 2 Summary Statistics 
Variables  Developing countries  Industrialized Countries 
(in logs)  # Observations  Mean  Std. Dev.  # Observations  Mean  Std. Dev. 
RDGDP 136  -4,9717  2,4861  128  0,2165  0,6572 
GDPPC 211  7,4079  1,0788  131  9,6643  0,4191 
POP 216  9,3663  1,6868  132  9,5112  1,4927 
L_RDGDP 121  -5,3399  2,2945  106  0,1661  0,6773 
GDPG 208  2,9089  0,3292  131  2,8633  0,1601 
POL 216  0,3511  0,4787  132  0,0303  0,1721 
SAV 202  2,7411  0,8265  125  3,1495  0,2256 
INTRATE 136  2,9411  1,3387  128  1,9933  0,5085 
OPEN 216  3,8973  0,7146  132  3,7517  0,5410 
IP 216  0,6788  0,4376  132  1,1866  0,2100 
EDU 203  1,4979  0,5256  132  2,0795  0,2732 
Countries 36  -  -  22  -  - 
 
  5IPR are expected to support private investments in R&D, therefore private R&D investments as a 
proportion of GDP would appear to be a more appropriate dependent variable. Still, given that the 
classification of R&D tends to be between productive and non-productive sectors, and that these 
series are not stable over time, I use aggregated R&D expenditures. Moreover, working with aggre-
gated R&D expenditures allows including more LDCs in the sample. 
3.2. Estimation 
Given the theoretical importance of technology-push factors, the past investments in R&D as a pro-
portion of GDP, i.e. the lagged dependent variable, is used as a regressor. This introduction gener-
ates a dynamic relationship of the type  
,
'
1 , it it t i it u x y y + + = − β α   i = 1, …, N and t = 2, …, T 
where α is a scalar,   is 1 x K and β is K x 1. The error component  is uit = ηi + vit where  
'
it x
E[ηi] = 0, E[vit], E[vit ηi] = 0 for i = 1, …, N and t = 2, …, T. The vit  are assumed to be serially 
uncorrelated E[vit vis] = 0 for i = 1, …, N and s ≠ t.  
Some problems arise from the introduction of the lagged variable on the right-hand-side. Since yit is 
a function of ηi, yi t-1 is also a function of ηi, causing a correlation between a regressor and the error 
term. This renders the OLS estimator inconsistent and biased (upwards). Estimation using fixed 
effects (FE) eliminates the inconsistency by eliminating ηi. However, for panels with small T, this 
induces a correlation between the transformed lagged dependent variable and the transformed error 
term, which causes the fixed effects estimator to be biased (downwards). The estimates of α ob-
tained with these two methods can however be used as boundaries to control for misspecification or 
inconsistency in other models.  
Arellano and Bond (1991, hereafter AB) proposed a generalized method of moments (GMM) pro-
cedure where they use orthogonality conditions between yi, t-1  and the disturbance vit to obtain sup-
plementary instruments, which yields a consistent estimator. Other authors (eg. Blundell and Bond, 
1998, hereafter BB) have since found that weak instruments could cause large finite sample biases, 
especially when time series are persistent and the number of series observations is small. They pro-
  6pose a “system” GMM estimator using equations in differences and in levels, to bring additional 
moment conditions and increase efficiency. Such estimation procedure is adequate for panels with 
large N and small T (asymptotic properties). For finite samples, Windmeijer (2005) has developed a 
correction for the two-step covariance matrix that significantly increases the efficiency of these 
GMM estimators.  
The availability of data is problematic: For none of the developing countries is the dependent vari-
able available for all periods (5-year averages, 1970-1995), and there are also missing observations 
in the sample of industrialized countries. However, the GMM estimators are robust to missing ob-
servations. I therefore use these estimators (AB, BB, as well as OLS and FE,) to identify the deter-
minants of innovation and the role of IPR, but also to identify the most appropriate estimator for 
datasets where both N and T are small. The equations are estimated using Stata 8, for the system 
GMM estimator a program created by Roodman (2005) is used. Tests for the presence of autocorre-
lation indicated that the hypothesis of no first-order autocorrelation could be rejected, as the hy-




4.1. Developing countries  
Table 3 presents the estimation results for the different models, for the sample of developing coun-
tries. For all models, the F-tests show that the parameters are jointly significant (at the 1% level). 
For the two GMM estimators, the Hansen and Sargan tests result in the non-rejection of the null 
hypothesis, which implies that the over-identifying restrictions are valid. The tests for the presence 
of autocorrelation in the residuals, for the system GMM estimator (BB), show satisfactory results. 
However, the presence of first-order correlation in the residuals in the AB regressions is not re-
jected, as it should be, which indicates that the estimates are inconsistent (Arellano and Bond, 1991: 
281). I will hence concentrate on the results from the system GMM (BB) regression, where the 
specification is appropriate.  
  7Following expectations,  OLS α  >  FE α , and  BB α  and  AB α  lie in the interval, even though  AB α  is not 
significant. α  has the expected sign in the BB regression, which supports the technology-push hy-
pothesis. The IP variable is also positive and significant, as is the human capital. Even though it is 
not significant, the cost of capital (INTRATE) has the expected sign, but not population (POP) and 
GDP per capita (GDPPC), which contradicts the demand effect hypothesis.  
Table 2. Estimation results for sample of developing countries 
Variables OLS  FE  AB  BB 





















































































Note: significant at the 1% level:* **, 5%: **, 10%: *.  Standard errors in parentheses.  
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4.2. Industrialized countries 
Table 4 presents the results of the estimations for the sample of industrialized countries. For all 
models, the F-tests show that the parameters are jointly significant (at the 1% level). Again, for the 
  8two GMM estimators, the Hansen and Sargan tests of over-identification, as well as the tests for the 
presence of autocorrelation in the residuals show satisfactory results for both GMM estimators. This 
time, α  has the expected positive sign and is significant in all regressions, again supporting the 
technology-push hypothesis, and  OLS α  >  FE α , with  BB α  in the interval, but  not  AB α . Again, I will 
concentrate on the results of the system GMM estimator, given that the Sargan/ Hansen  and auto-
correlation tests yield more satisfying results. 
This time, the IP variable is negative, even though not significant, as is the human capital (EDU), 
contrary to expectations. However, population (POP) and GDP per capita (GDPPC), proxying the 
demand-pull effect, are now both positive and significant, at the 10% and 5% level, respectively. 
Furthermore, the variable openness to trade (OPEN), accounting for competition, is also positive 
and significant at the 10% level, which indicated that in more open countries, facing more competi-
tion, more resources are invested in innovative activity. The other variables are not significant, but 
the political failure (POL) and cost of capital (INTRATE) are negative, as expected, while the 
availability of capital (SAV) and the GDP growth rate, proxying the stability of the economy, are 
negative.  
Table 4. Estimation results for sample of industrialized countries 
Variables OLS  FE  AB  BB 






























































































Note: significant at the 1% level:* **, 5%: **, 10%: *.  Standard errors in parentheses.  
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Countries included in each regression listed in appendix 
 
 
5. Discussion   
5.1. Analysis of the results 
These results suggest that innovation, in both developing and industrialized countries, strongly de-
pends on past R&D investments, the so-called “technology-push” factor, and more importantly so 
in industrialized countries. This could be due to the fact that in most industrialized countries, firms 
and research institutes have a high level of technological capabilities and hence benefit from ad-
vances in science pushing further the technological frontier, i.e., domestic investments and invest-
ments from other industrialized countries. Conversely, the level of technological capabilities 
amongst firms and research institutes in LDCs is in general lower (or more heterogeneous), and 
these have access to spillovers from the R&D activities in industrialized countries, and the role of 
domestic investments would hence not be as important. This is supported by empirical evidence in 
Coe, Helpman and Hoffmaister (1997) who found that R&D spillovers are especially important 
when countries are trading with countries with higher technological capabilities. This is however 
the only factor for which the (significant) effect is the same in both samples. 
The importance of the level of human capital (EDU) in LDCs could reflect the general scarcity of 
this resource among the countries of the sample, and the comparatively high level of R&D invest-
ments in countries with more human capital (South Korea, Israel). Conversely, the relatively homo-
geneous level of human capital amongst industrialized countries, and the generally high-level char-
acter of the science performed in these countries could explain the lack of significance of this vari-
able in that sample. IPR is a positive and significant factor explaining domestic R&D investments 
  10in LDCs, but not in industrialized countries. This outcome could result from the omission of a 
measure of institutional capacity
iii, that IPR would capture in LDCs, and that would not play such 
an important role in industrialized countries.  
Finally, in industrialized countries the demand-pull factors (POP, GDPPC) play an important role, 
but not in LDCs. In the same line of though as the discussion on the technology-push factors, de-
mand for innovation in LDCs can be satisfied from several sources – domestic and foreign – while 
the demand for a variety of differentiated products, adapted to the local conditions, more important 
in industrialized countries might explain this situation. Another explanation would be that the char-
acteristics of the markets in LDCs (high transaction costs) impair the transmission, and hence the 
impact, of demand for innovation.  
These results are consistent with those of previous studies discussed in section 4. However, the 
number of significant parameters is a lot higher in these other studies, and the estimation methods 
differ: Kanwar and Evenson use OLS on the equation in logarithmic form, in a static model (not 
including past R&D investments), ignoring the potential role of technology-push factors on innova-
tion, which are here found to be important. On the other hand, Lederman and Maloney use the 
GMM system estimator, which is expected to yield consistent estimators for panels with large N 
and small T, without correcting for the small sample bias, which causes the standard errors to be 
underestimated (Windmeijer, 2005). Furthermore, they chose to estimate certain variables in loga-
rithmic form where the interpretation of the results becomes problematic and contrary to standard 
procedures, e.g., estimating most variables in levels but the IP index in logarithmic form. Even 
though Kanwar and Evenson (2003) look at the determinants of private R&D and Lederman and 
Maloney (2003) use aggregate R&D, they obtain similar results. 
 
5.2. Econometric issues 
From the econometric perspective, several points need to be addressed. The small size of the data-
sets and the problem of missing observations can induce biased in the estimations performed, and 
hence affect the quality and reliability of the results obtained. In cases where few observations are 
  11missing, the benefits of replacing them with imputation and interpolation methods are higher than 
the costs (reduced reliability of the estimations) but in situation with several missing observations, 
the costs might be too high. The system GMM estimator developed by Blundell and Bond, along 
with the finite sample correction developed by Windmeijer, seems to be the most appropriate for the 
estimation of panel datasets with small T and relatively small N, based on the specification tests 
(Hansen test of over-identification, tests for the presence of first- and second-order autocorrelation 
in the residuals) and on the theory.  
There might also be a selection bias in the DC dataset since the countries for which data are avail-
able possess a certain level of institutional capacity. This de facto eliminates countries with lower 
levels of institutional capacity and takes away some of the variability, and hence representativity of 
the sample. However, data for these countries are not available, and the results derived for LDCs, 
especially when compared with the ones of industrialized countries, also provide useful information 
for policy-making in countries at lower levels of development. 
 
6. Conclusion   
This paper identifies the determinants of innovation using a panel of developing and industrialized 
countries, applying different panel estimation methods to the case of panels with relatively small N 
and T. Previous investments in R&D are found to be an important factor explaining private R&D 
investments, in both samples, while intellectual property protection and human capital would be 
important factors supporting innovation in LDCs, and openness to trade and demand-pull factors 
such as GDP per capita and population would be instrumental in industrialized countries. The 
GMM system estimator is found to be the most appropriate estimator for datasets with rather small 
N and small T, in this case with missing observations and heteroskedasticity.  
The results indicate that demand-pull factors become more important for countries that have at-
tained a certain level of development. In LDCs, the importance of IPR as a determinant of innova-
tion, especially in regressions where no other variable accounts for the quality of institutions, indi-
cates the significance of institutions for the process. Similarly, investments in research and devel-
  12opment, but also in human capital, are instrumental to support innovation in LDCs, and thus sup-
porting economic development.  
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